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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's July 3, 1989 decision in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1 generated increased debate in
the courts, the press, and the legislatures about not only the right of
women to choose to have an abortion, but also about the related,
more general issue whether the law should ever recognize the fetus
as an entity separate from the woman carrying it. The Missouri law
challenged in Webster sought not only to restrict a woman's exercise
of her right to make her own decisions concerning abortion, but also
to define life and legal "personhood" as beginning at conception.
Fueled by the Webster Court's decision to uphold both the Missouri
law's sweeping definition of legal personhood and its substantive
abortion restrictions, as well as by the general controversy surround-
ing abortion, the need to appropriately define the fetus' legal status
has become critical in other contexts as well. Each day's newspapers
report criminal prosecutions of women for allegedly causing harm to
their fetuses through their actions while pregnant-from driving
while intoxicated to failing to follow their doctors' orders concerning
the abuse of illegal substances;2 women are jailed during and after
pregnancy for behavior determined by the government to be against
the interests of their fetuses;' recently, the Webster decision touched
even the legal status of frozen embryos in Tennessee.
4
t Legal Director, National Abortion Rights Action League. B.A. 1983; J.D.
1986, Yale University. I would like to thank for their valuable suggestions on this
article, Walter Dellinger, Kyra Kazantzis, Lois Murphy, Randolph Moss, Lisa
Swanson, Marcy Wilder, Claudia Worrell, and especially Catherine Bell Fleming, who
also provided important research, and Gene Sperling, for his tremendous assistance
throughout the writing of this article.
I 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2 See, e.g., Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 10, 1989,
at 8; Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 3, 1988, at 1.
3 See, e.g., A Matter of Conscience, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 7, 1988, at 13;Jailed Because She is
Pregnant: A Superior Court Judge Went Beyond His Duty, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1988, at C8.
4 See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 17-18 (Tenn. App., Sept. 21, 1989)
(holding in divorce case that frozen embryos are "incipient persons" entitled to legal
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The Missouri law's sweeping declaration that the fetus is a per-
son under Missouri law,5 (and the position of opponents of abortion
that life begins at conception) blurs the subtle issues at the heart of
this debate. As one reporter wrote, "[i]nevitably, the dilemma of
pregnant drug users becomes part of the national abortion argu-
ment, with pro-choice forces contending that recognition of fetal
rights diminishes women's rights, and anti-abortionists insisting that
the unborn child deserves protection. '"6 The Webster Court's
approval of the Missouri declaration of fetal personhood increases
the danger that these important social problems will be resolved
oversimplistically and without concern for and recognition of
women's fundamental rights.
The fetus is a physical part of a woman. This essential fact leads
both to limitations and possibilities for the government's ability to
promote its interest in improving the health of newborns by affecting
fetal development. The law's treatment of the fetus has far-reaching
implications for women's legal status: allowing the government to
impose special penalties and restrictions on pregnant women's
actions in order to promote asserted interests in the fetus would, if
unchecked, enable the government virtually to dictate how pregnant
women must live their lives. Yet legal conflicts are not inherent in
the relationship between the pregnant woman and the fetus she car-
ries. The law also can recognize and build upon the desired future
child. Before allowing the imposition of restrictions on pregnant
women's behavior that are not imposed generally on others, courts
should strictly scrutinize the special burdens in order to ensure that
they actually further the government's interest and do not unneces-
sarily infringe on women's liberty.
I. THE MISSOURI DECLARATION THAT LIFE BEGINS AT CONCEPTION
The clause of the Missouri law most obviously hostile to
women's reproductive rights is the law's opening declaration that
"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception." 7 That provi-
sion continues with the statement that "[u]nborn children have pro-
protection, custody of which should be awarded according to the best interests of the
child standard, and noting that "the recent Webster case leaves upon the door for a
state to establish its compelling interest in protecting even potential human life").
5 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
6 Pregnant Addicts: Drug Babies Push Issue of Fetal Rights, L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1989
at I, col. 3.
7 Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (1986).
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tectable interests in life, health, and well-being" 8 and that Missouri
laws must be interpreted to provide fetuses with "all the rights, privi-
leges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and resi-
dents of this state." 9
The breadth of this sweeping creation of fetal rights allows for
no consideration of the different governmental purposes that might
motivate fetal recognition in different contexts or of the most effec-
tive means of furthering each of the relevant government purposes.
Nor does the declaration invoke the least intrusive way of furthering
those interests in light of the fundamental rights of women that are
at stake. Rather, it casts aside women's individual rights in pursuit of
some undefined notion of fetal rights with far-reaching and largely
unforeseen results.
A. The Webster Court's Interpretation of the Declaration
When coupled with operative statutory provisions, the declara-
tion's expansive language conflicts dramatically with a woman's right
to choose to have an abortion; in fact, the Missouri legislature
enacted this provision as part of a comprehensive statute that places
numerous restrictions on abortion.' Nevertheless, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing on this issue for a majority of five Justices, found
that the declaration could be construed as merely expressing a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and as such having no
8 Id. at § 1.205.1(2).
9 Id. at § 1.205.2. [hereinafter, this section of the Missouri statute shall be
referred to as the declaration].
10 In addition to the declaration, the Court in Webster was asked to determine the
constitutionality of several other restrictions on abortion contained in Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 188 (1986). A majority of the Court upheld § 188.215's prohibition on the use of
public facilities (broadly defined) in the performance of abortions, even in cases
which do not involve the expenditure of any public funds. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at
3050-53. The Court also upheld § 188.029's requirement that before a physician
performs an abortion on a woman the physician "has reason to believe" is twenty or
more weeks pregnant, the physician must determine whether the fetus is viable by
performing "such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding
of the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity" of the fetus. See id. at 3054-59.
The Court dismissed as moot a challenge to § 188.205's prohibition on the use of
public funds "for the purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an
abortion not necessary to save her life." Id. at 3053.
The Supreme Court did not address § 188.025's requirement that all abortions
at or after sixteen weeks gestational age be performed in a hospital, because Missouri
chose not to appeal the district court's holding that this provision is unconstitutional.
See Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407, 416-20 (W.D. Mo.
1987) (citing as controlling City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)).
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substantive effect on a woman's right to an abortion. In support of
this interpretation, the Court stated that the provision "does not by
its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellees' medical
practice."'" The Court did not acknowledge the absurdity of inter-
preting the expansive language of the declaration-which by its
express terms grants fetuses legal personhood under other Missouri
laws-to exclude the very abortion restrictions with which it was
enacted. By upholding the declaration, but leaving open the possi-
bility of a future challenge to its constitutionality, the Court was able
to avoid ruling on issues at the core of the fundamental right to pri-
vacy, most notably the extent of a woman's freedom to choose to
have an abortion.'
2
The four dissenting Justices would have invalidated the declara-
tion as conflicting with women's right to make their own decisions
concerning abortion. The dissenters noted that because the law
defines life as beginning at conception and conception as occurring
at the time of fertilization rather than implantation, 3 it interferes
with more than the right to choose to have an abortion. Addition-
ally, the declaration, in combination with the operative restrictions in
the statute, restricts a woman's right to use methods of contracep-
tives that can prevent implantation of the fertilized ovum during the
six to seven days after fertilization has occurred: the IUD, the "morn-
ing after" pill, low-dosage oral contraceptives, and the French-pro-
duced drug RU-486. The state of Missouri claimed that the
declaration did not reach the use of contraceptives that operate post-
fertilization, but presented little support for its position. The Court
11 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had held that because the Missouri declaration was enacted as part of a
statute regulating abortion, "[t]he only plausible inference" was that "the state
intended its abortion regulations to be understood against the backdrop of its theory
of life." Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1076 (8th Cir.
1988). In so ruling, the Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's statement in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that "a State may not adopt one theory of when
life begins to justify its regulation of abortions." Reproductive Health Services, 851 F.2d
at 1075-76 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 444, citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 159-62).
12 Although four Justices expressed disagreement with the holding in Roe,
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth and critical vote for upholding two of the
abortion restrictions, and she relied on relatively narrow grounds framed in a
manner that avoided reconsideration of the standards for protecting the right to
choose abortion. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3060-61.
13 This is contrary to the accepted medical definition of conception. The
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defines conception as "the
implantation of the blastocyst [fertilized ovum]." OBSTETRIC GYNECOLOGIC
TERMINOLOGY 229, 327 (E. Hughes ed. 1972).
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dismissed this problematic implication-with virtually no analysis-
as an uncertain application of the provision.
1 4
B. Other Applications of the Declaration
In rejecting the facial challenge to the Missouri declaration as
restrictive of access to abortion and contraceptives, the Supreme
Court suggested that Missouri state courts might interpret the decla-
ration's substantive impact as limited to protections already afforded
fetuses by state tort and probate law. Such an interpretation, how-
ever, could conflict with the declaration's express directive that, sub-
ject only to constitutional constraints, other state laws must be
interpreted to provide fetuses "all the rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties available to other persons, citizens, and residents of the state." 5
The Court did acknowledge that the declaration might be inter-
preted to have some substantive effect beyond existing recognition
of the fetus under state tort and probate law. Yet the Court deferred
14 The potential impact of the declaration on contraceptive use was discussed
not only in several of the briefs but also during the oral argument in Webster:.
Justice Scalia: I don't see why a court that can draw that line [between the
first, second and third trimesters] can't separate abortion from birth
control quite readily.
Mr. Susman: If I may suggest the reasons in response to your question,
Justice Scalia. The most common forms of what we generically in common
parlance call contraception today, IUD's, low-dose birth control pills,
which are the safest type of birth control pills available, act as
abortifacients. They are correctly labeled as both.
Under this statute, which defines fertilization as the point of
beginning, those forms of contraception are also abortifacients. Science
and medicine refers to them as both. We are not still dealing with the
common barrier methods of Griswold. We are no longer just talking
about condoms and diaphragms.
Things have changed. The bright line, if there ever was one, has now
been extinguished. That's why I suggest to this Court that we need to
deal with one right, the right to procreate. We are no longer talking about
two rights.
Transcript of Arguments Before Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at B12,
B13, col. 2.
Justice Stevens: But the preamble would make your prohibition against
abortions in public facilities apply to things like installing an IUD and that
sort of thing.
Mr. Webster: Your Honor, we would contend that is not the case. We
believe it would take an additional specific statutory enactment by the Mis-
souri General Assembly to do that. The only language we have now
found in Chapter 188 is silent as to abortions before viability, and we cer-
tainly wouldn't construe that the preamble alone -
Correction: Transcription In Abortion Argument, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1989, at B8, col. 5.
15 Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986).
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consideration of the constitutionality of the declaration until a future
challenge to a specific attempted application of the provision:
We think the extent to which the preamble's language might be
used to interpret other state statutes or regulations is something
that only the courts of Missouri can definitively decide .... It will
be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the
[declaration] should it be applied to restrict the activities of appel-
lees in some concrete way.
16
Already, in the few months since the Webster decision, the sweep-
ing and indiscriminate declaration has been applied in bizarre ways,
demonstrating the far-reaching and often unforeseen consequences
of a broad law creating fetal personhood. For instance, two Missouri
courts applied the provision in a manner directly harmful to abortion
providers and women requiring their services. Twojudges acquitted
a total of twenty-five people of charges of criminal trespass in con-
nection with anti-abortion protests at abortion clinics." 7 The judges
accepted the protestors' defense that their criminal actions were nec-
essary to stop a greater evil, the taking of unborn "lives." Noting the
Supreme Court's refusal in Webster to invalidate the Missouri declara-
tion, the judges found that the declaration supported the protestors'
use of the necessity defense.is As one judge stated, under the decla-
ration "an unborn child is a person entitled to all the rights... pos-
sessed by a born child" and "violations [of trespassing laws] were
necessary as emergency measures to avoid the... death and maim-
ing of unborn children."'" This interpretation of the Missouri law
could thus be used to legitimize protestors' violent destruction of a
clinics' medical equipment, or even a clinic itself.2 ° The St. Louis
16 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
17 See Abortion Protesters Acquitted in City, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1989, at
1; Twenty-one Abortion Protestors Acquitted of Trespassing, Wash. Times, Aug. 17, 1989, at
5; Abortion Foes Exonerated in St. Louis, Kansas City Times, Aug. 17, 1989, at 1; Abortion
Protesters Acquitted - 'Necessity Defense' Scores First Victory, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug.
17, 1989, at I. This issue is currently before the Michigan Court of Appeals in a case
in which the lower court rejected the necessity defense and sentenced a woman to 75
days in jail for criminal trespass. See Anti-Abortion Appeal Uses 'Necessity' Issue, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1989, at 1.
18 These rulings conflict directly with the Supreme Court's recognition of
women's right to choose to have abortions. As discussed above, the Webster majority
ruled only that it would not consider the declaration's constitutionality until a state
court had interpreted the statute's scope or the provision had been applied in a
detrimental fashion. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
19 Abortion Protestors Acquitted, supra note 17.
20 Between the years 1977 and 1987, there were 712 reported acts of violence
against abortion providers including bombings, arson, hostage-taking, burglary,
vandalism and death threats. BetweenJanuary of 1987 and August 15, 1989, there
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Circuit Attorney commented, "[tihe next thing these people are
going to do is start killing guards at these buildings and claiming that
they have a right to do it."
2'
The Missouri declaration was also cited by a twenty-year-old
man charged with driving while intoxicated and possession of alco-
hol by a minor. The man faced, losing his driver's license under a
state law that mandates the loss of a license for anyone under 21 who
is convicted of driving while intoxicated.22 The man claimed that the
law did not apply to him, however, arguing that he had reached the
age of 21 under Missouri law because the declaration adds nine
months of gestation to his life.
23
A lawyer representing a pregnant woman who is currently serv-
ing a three-year prison sentence for forgery and theft cited the decla-
ration in a suit filed on behalf of the woman's fetus.2 4 The suit
contends that by incarcerating the woman, the state is unconstitu-
tionally imprisoning the fetus because the fetus was not first
"charged with a crime, allowed an attorney, convicted or sentenced."
The suit also alleges that the fetus was "denied adequate diet, medi-
cal care and 'the opportunity to develop into a healthy live born child
because of conditions at the prison." 25 The fetus' lawyer stated, "If
life begins at conception, then fetuses are supposed to be like anyone
else - They're a person [sic] and they have constitutional rights."26
Under this reasoning, pregnant women could never be jailed for
were 21,742 arrests of persons blockading abortion clinics. See NATIONAL ABORTION
FEDERATION, INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS
1989.
21 See Abortion A'rotestors Acquitted in City, supra note 17. The Model Penal Code
commentaries suggest that the necessity defense is available where a person kills one
person in order to save the lives of two or more people. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.02 comment (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958).
22 See Abortion Protesters Acquitted in City, supra note 17.
23 See id.
24 The attorney in this case apparently was motivated by the important goal of
ensuring that the woman would obtain adequate care during her pregnancy: he also
filed a companion suit on behalf of the woman alleging that the prison was violating
her constitutional rights "by failing to provide her with a proper diet, medical care,
exercise and a safe environment in which to carry the fetus." The attorney was
quoted as saying, "I'm not pro-choice or pro-life or any of that stuff. But I think
there's some problems [sic] with the law and the courts are eventually going to have
to rule on it." Fetus Illegally Jailed, Suit Says, Arkansas Democrat, Aug 4, 1989, at 9A.
This second lawsuit is obviously the preferable approach for the law to take because
it is aimed at remedying the actual harm: the prison's alleged failure to provide
adequate prenatal care for the pregnant woman, and not the imprisonment of a fetus
without affording it due process.
25 Id.
2 ( Fetus Illegally Jailed, Inmate's Lawyer Argues, Wash. Times, Aug. 4, 1989 at 4.
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committing any-crime, given the that fetuses are incapable of com-
mitting crimes and thus should not be imprisoned along with
women.
2 7
C. From Recognition Under Tort And Probate Law To The Creation of
Maternal-Fetal Conflicts
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the declaration as poten-
tially limited to existing protections under state tort and probate law
ignores not only the express language of the declaration, but also
crucial distinctions between the limited purposes served by fetal rec-
ognition under tort and probate laws and the broad purpose behind
the Missouri declaration. Historically, American law did not recog-
nize the fetus as a legal entity distinct from the pregnant woman car-
rying it. Legal recognition of the fetus first occurred in narrow,
specifically identified contexts under tort and probate law to advance
specific purposes that do not depend on a particular moral view of
the fetus' value and do not create legal conflicts with pregnant
women.
28
These initial laws did not in any sense create independent "fetal
rights," but were aimed at protecting the interests of people, includ-
ing pregnant women; in certain circumstances this required the law
to acknowledge the existence of the fetus before birth. For example,
the legal fiction of considering a fetus to be a person if a child is
subsequently born alive was first adopted for the purposes of inheri-
tance law. This fiction respects the presumed desire of a deceased
man to provide for a child conceived by him but not"yet born at the
27 As a result of the legal confusion caused by the declaration, two Missouri
state legislators have submitted requests to Missouri Attorney General William
Webster, who argued the Webster case for Missouri, for opinions about the legal effect
of the provision. Specifically, the legislators have asked for opinions as to the effect
of the definition of life beginning at conception on the legal age to sign contracts,
vote, marry, obtain a driver's license, serve or be served alcoholic beverages, drop
out of school, be segregated from adult prisoners, be under the jurisdiction of
juvenile court, inherit money or property, and receive benefits under insurance
policies. A legislator also stated that she plans to request an attorney general
opinion about whether two Missouri courts were correct in ruling that the declaration
supports a necessity defense for anti-choice protestors accused of trespassing at
clinics where abortions are performed. See Webster's Views Sought on Use of Abortion Law,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 6, 1989, at 1.
28 For a more extensive discussion of the history of the development of the legal
status of the fetus, see Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE LJ. 599, 600-13
(1986) (authored by Dawn Johnsen).
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time of his death.2 9 Similarly, in 1946 a court first recognized a
child's cause of action for injuries inflicted upon a pregnant woman
where the injuries interfered with the development of a viable fetus
and resulted in the child suffering after birth from the effects of the
prenatally inflicted harm.
3 0
Until recently, the law applied these forms of fetal recognition
were applied solely in ways consistent with and supportive of the
interests of pregnant women, including their interest in reproductive
autonomy. Because the fetus is a physical part of a woman, third
parties can tortiously harm fetal development only by physically
assaulting or battering a pregnant woman. The threat of legal action
deters such tortious acts and therefore directly benefits pregnant
women as their future children. Moreover, allowing a child's parents
to sue and recover damages on behalf of the child may enable the
parents to meet the added expenses associated with the child's inju-
ries. Many states subsequently went beyond this cause of action to
allow recovery against third parties for causing a woman's pregnancy
to terminate without her consent; this protects pregnant women
from severe bodily intrusion, physical harm and the involuntary ter-
mination of wanted pregnancies.
3 '
In sharp contrast, the declaration, by making the subjective
29 See, e.g., Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520, 136 S.E. 551 (1927); McLain v.
Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899); Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A.
414 (1887); see also Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C. 537, 538, 137 S.E. 596, 597 (1927)
(stating that the civil law rule as to the recognition of fetuses "apparently was based
upon the presumed oversight or inadvertence of the parent in providing for an
existing or a contingent situation"). Even within property law, recognition of the
fetus is the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158
N.E.2d 841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959) (holding that a fetus was not a person
"beneficially interested" for purposes of § 23 of New York Personal Property Law
and distinguishing the distinctive purposes served by the "fiction" of considering a
fetus subsequently born alive a person for certain other matters of property law).
30 See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (first case to
recognize a cause of action by a child for injuries received in utero after viability).
31 In some cases, state courts have stated explicitly that the purpose behind
recognizing this cause of action is to compensate parents. See Volk v. Baldazo, 103
Idaho 570, 574, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (1982) ("[T]he wrongful death statute confers upon
parents a cause of action for the wrongful death of a 'child' and thus protects the
rights and interests of the parents, and not those of the decedent child"); Dunn v.
Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830,,832-33 (Iowa 1983) (distinguishing between claim
by estate of fetus under state's survival statute in which "the wrong is done to the
injured person and to that persons's estate," and a claim by parents for loss of a fetus
under a wrongful death statute in which "the wrong is done to a child's parents," and
concluding that the wrongful death statute, "involved ... a right of recovery given to
a parent. The parent's loss does not depend on the legal status of the child"). Other
state courts, however, have relied on a general state interest in protecting life. See
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value judgment that life begins at conception, confers upon the fetus
qua the fetus sweeping rights, privileges, and immunities of per-
sonhood guaranteed under Missouri law that are capable of com-
pletely overriding the rights of women in a variety of contexts. The
declaration was enacted as part of a statute designed to interfere with
a woman's ability to exercise the right to choose to have an abortion.
The declaration thus creates a legal regime centered on creating
conflict between a woman and the fetus she carries. Despite the Web-
ster majority's misleading reference to tort and probate law, the dec-
laration's attempt to create fetal personhood reflects a far different
purpose, with far more ominous implications for pregnant women:
to protect the fetus qua fetus in a wide range of undelineated
contexts.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 12 is also
partly responsible for recent deviations in the legal treatment of the
fetus. The Court in Roe held that after the point of fetal viability (at
which point the fetus is able to survive outside the womb) the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in the potential life of the fetus
that justifies prohibiting a woman from intentionally aborting the
fetus.33 The Court permitted states to interfere with the rights of
pregnant women contemplating abortion in order to promote an
adverse interest asserted by the state in protecting the potential life
of the viable fetus. Although the direct impact on women's rights is
minimal because few women choose to have abortions late in preg-
nancy, and those that do have the most compelling of reasons, the
decision set a dangerous precedent by recognizing a governmental
interest in the fetus that is not contingent on live birth and is not
aimed at protecting the interests of women or children.
Nonetheless, the Court in Roe created only a narrow exception
to the general rule of individual reproductive autonomy and held
more generally that the fundamental right to privacy guarantees indi-
viduals freedom from governmental intrusion in matters concerning
Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 639 (La. 1981) (citing legislative pronouncement
that "a human being exists from the moment of fertilization and implantation").
Similarly, penalizing third parties for causing a woman's pregnancy to terminate
without her consent through criminal laws can be viewed as protecting pregnant
women from physical assault and serious harm. Although most states that have used
the criminal law in this manner have done so by defining the fetus to be the victim of
the crime, at least one state explicitly focused the law's protection on the pregnant
woman, rather than the fetus. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Supp. 1989).
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33 See id. at 163.
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childbearing. 34 Even within the narrow exception, the government's
ability to promote its interest in the fetus is constitutionally con-
strained: after viability, the-government may prohibit abortion only
if the pregnancy creates no threat to the woman's physical or mental
health.3 5 The Roe Court expressly rejected any notion of "fetal per-
sonhood" under the United States Constitution, finding instead that
"the law has [traditionally] been reluctant to endorse any theory that
life... begins before live birth" and that historically the legal rights
of fetuses were limited to "narrowly-defined situations and . . .
[were] contingent on live birth."3 6 The Roe Court's recognition of a
compelling state interest in the potential life of a viable fetus does
not, therefore, support the sweeping creation of "fetal rights" con-
templated by the Missouri declaration.
While the Webster Court rejected the contention that the declara-
tion affects women's rights concerning abortion or contraception,
the Court failed even to note that the declaration's sweeping creation
of "fetal rights" might pose the severe threats to women's liberty in
other contexts. This danger is not limited to cases of fetal recogni-
tion premised on a particular valuation of the fetus qua fetus.
Women's liberty is jeopardized any time the law treats the fetus as a
legal entity independent of the pregnant woman, including those
instances in which fetal recognition is contingent upon subsequent
live birth and is therefore meant to protect the interests of children.
For example, though tort actions for prenatal injuries almost invaria-
bly have been applied to further women's interests, the recognition
of this cause of action can be used to subvert the rights of pregnant
women. For example, one court allowed a child to sue his mother
for allegedly causing him to be born with discolored teeth by using
the antibiotic tetracycline during pregnancy.
3 7
The fetus is a physical part of the pregnant woman. This fact
allows the law to protect fetal development and future children by
protecting women from physical injury. Yet this fact also creates the
potential for extreme deprivations of women's liberty when the gov-
ernment asserts an interest in the fetus that is hostile to women's
autonomy. When drafting the declaration, the Missouri legislature
exhibited some sensitivity to this potential problem. A provision of
the same statute states, "[n]othing in this section shall be interpreted
as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming
34 See id. at 152-53.
35 See id. at 163-64.
3 6 See id. at 161.
37 See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
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her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing
to follow any particular program of prenatal care." Although this
provision may protect women from being sued by their children for
acting "negligently" during pregnancy, the declaration that life
begins at conception nonetheless threatens women with other forms
of government interference that is ostensibly aimed at "protecting"
fetuses from the women who bear them.
Before the majority in Webster ruled that the declaration might
have no or little substantive effect, a Missouri court had already
applied the provision in a manner directly hostile to the rights of
women. 38 A state court relied on the declaration in overriding the
informed medical decision of a competent pregnant woman and
ordering her to submit to a cesarean section. The court found that
"the life, health and well-being" of the woman's fetus "may bejeop-
ardized" by her decision not to have the surgery.39 The Deaconess
Hospital case, just as other recent instances in which the government
has asserted interests in the fetus to justify overriding the decisions
and interests of pregnant women, raises profound questions as to
what, if any, limits the United States Constitution places on the abil-
ity of the government to treat a pregnant woman and the fetus she
bears as legal adversaries, with the government defining and repre-
senting the interests of the fetus against the woman.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON GOVERNMENTAL ASSERTION OF
FETAL INTERESTS
Just as the Missouri declaration deviates sharply from the legal
status traditionally afforded the fetus, in other isolated instances dur-
ing the past decade courts have used both the civil and criminal law
to impose upon women special penalties and restrictions that require
them to act in the best interests of the fetuses they carry, or may
carry in the future. These special restrictions on liberty have been
imposed on women before, during, and after pregnancy, and have
intruded upon a wide range of activities and decisions, from poten-
tially harmful and even illegal behavior such as the use of illegal
38 The declaration was also cited by a Missouri court as evidence of a state
policy favoring life in order to support its ruling preventing the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from a permanently comatose patient. See Cruzan v. Missouri
Dep't of Health, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S.
July 3, 1989) (No. 88-1503) (to be argued Dec. 6, 1988).
39 See Deaconess Hosp. v. McRoberts, No. 874-00172 (St. Louis Cir. Ct. May 21,
1987).
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drugs to socially important and valued behavior such as working,
driving, and obtaining necessary medical treatment.
The government certainly can and should enforce criminal laws
against pregnant women criminal laws that apply equally to the gen-
eral population. Any governmental action, however, that singles out
women for special penalties and restrictions solely because they are
or may become pregnant should be recognized as implicating the
fundamental right to privacy, which is based in the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of liberty. In particular, such governmental
interference implicates two strands of the fundamental right to pri-
vacy: the right to choose to bear a child and the right to bodily integ-
rity.' ° Although not all such governmental interference with
women's liberty is necessarily impermissible, all such governmental
intrusion should be subject to the strict scrutiny standard ofjudicial
review. Attempts by the government to implement its definition of
women's optimal procreative role through the imposition of special
restrictions constitute a tremendous intrusion on women's lives.
Courts should uphold such intrusions only if the government dem-
onstrates that it possesses a compelling interest and that this interest
is furthered by means that are the least burdensome on women's
fundamental rights.41
A. Scope of Threatened Infringements on Women's Liberty
In order to determine whether women's fundamental rights are
threatened by a governmental attempt to dictate women's behavior
based on women's reproductive capacity, it is critical to consider the
nature and scope of the intrusions on women's liberty that would
result if courts did not closely scrutinize the government's use of the
fetus as a vehicle by which to restrict women's actions. Because the
fetus is a completely dependent, physical part of a pregnant woman
that can be affected only through her body, allowing the government
to demand that women comport themselves in the best interests of
their fetuses-as the government defines those best interests-would
effectively create an adversarial relationship within the woman's own
body that she could avoid only by aborting the pregnancy. Were
40 For general discussions of the constitutional issues raised by this form of fetal
recognition, see Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Intervention: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 9 (1987); Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The
Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Note, supra note
28.
.I I See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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these laws subject only to rational relationship review, the govern-
ment would have a free hand to single out women for special restric-
tions that could amount to virtually totalitarian control of a woman's
physical being and life during pregnancy. The legal fiction of "fetal
personhood" masks this critical reality.
A wide range of common conditions and activities by a pregnant
woman can pose some threat to fetal development, including: being
overweight or underweight, working or even living in certain envi-
ronments, rejecting or undergoing specific medical treatments, exer-
cising, not exercising, failing to eat "well," failing to "stay off of her
feet," smoking, drinking alcohol, ingesting caffeine, taking nonpre-
scription, prescription, or illegal drugs, and suffering physical harm
through accident or illness.42 These behaviors can affect fetal devel-
opment even before a woman knows she is pregnant, as can a
woman's health or behavior even prior to pregnancy. Under a law
that declared legal personhood to begin at conception and allowed
the government to second-guess women's decisions and actions on
the basis of their effect on fetuses, any of these behaviors could pro-
voke criminal prosecution, civil liability, incarceration, or other
direct state intervention.
Some advocates of this type of government interference with
women's procreative liberty have even advocated creating "a fetal
right to begin life with sound body and mind"43 or a woman's "duty
to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possi-
ble."44 Defining the government's interest in terms of a right on the
part of each fetus creates a legal framework with enormous potential
for conflict with the rights of each pregnant woman. A right "to
begin life with sound body and mind" would impose on women a
legal obligation to make themselves ideal incubators throughout the
nine months of pregnancy, sacrificing their obligations to their chil-
dren, husbands, and jobs, as well as to themselves. The range of
activities in which people typically engage on a daily basis would be
severely circumscribed for pregnant women, and at least to some
extent for all women. Given the tremendous problems in determin-
ing which among countless factors combined to cause, for example, a
42 These are among the activities cited as harmful to fetal development by those
who advocate the expansion of special governmental regulation of pregnant women's
behavior. See Note, supra note 28, at 605-09.
43 Dougherty, The Right to Begin Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal Patients and
Conflicts With Their Mothers, 63 U. DET. L. REv. 89, 89 (1985).
44 Robertson, Procreative Liberty and The Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 438 (1983).
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baby to be born prematurely or with low birthweight, women would
risk being held legally liable for any illness or perceived imperfection
in their child.
Carrying this rationale to its logical extreme, if each child had
the right to be born healthy, women might have a legal duty to abort
in cases of fetal deformity. One leading advocate of creating individ-
ual "fetal rights" has written that parents may have a legal obligation
"to act in reasonable ways to prevent the birth of a child who would
certainly or likely suffer prenatally, or to accept prenatal treatment if
it is expected to benefit the would-be child."45 At least one court has
suggested that a child could sue his or her mother for not having an
abortion because there was "no sound public policy which should
protect those parents from'being answerable for the pain, suffering
and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring." 46 Even if
a duty to abort were not recognized, allowing the legal system to
compel pregnant women to act in the interests of fetuses without
requiring the government intervention to be necessary to promote a
compelling interest, would create an incentive for women to have
abortions as well as to avoid pregnancy.
This "parade of horribles" is more than just a logical possibility:
for some women, it has become a reality. In relatively rare, but
varied and ominous instances, courts and legislatures have asserted
an interest in protecting fetuses to justify infringements on pregnant
women's liberty. These intrusions have taken many forms, including
court-ordered medical treatment and surgery (including in one case
surgery that contributed to a woman's death);47 lawsuits for prenatal
injuries brought against women by their own children for not behav-
ing like "reasonable" pregnant women (in one case, for using antibi-
otics during pregnancy, and in a second case, for driving negligently
during pregnancy);4" criminal prosecution for "prenatal child
45 Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. OF LEGAL MED. 63-66
(1984).
46 Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 488 (1980).
47 See Deaconess Hosp. v. McRoberts, No. 874-00172 (St. Louis Cir. Ct. May 21,
1987); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 617 (D.C. App. 1987), vacated & reh'g en banc granted,
539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988); Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical
Interventions, 316 N. ENG.J. MED. 1192 (1987).
48 A Michigan court created a cause of action allowing a child to sue his mother
for allegedly inflicting on him prenatal injuries through her use of the antibiotic
tetracycline during pregnancy. See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301
N.W.2d 869 (1980). The court remanded for a determination of whether the
woman's use of the antibiotic satisfied the relevant legal standard, which was that of a
"reasonable" pregnant woman. See id. at 400-02, 301 N.W.2d at 870-71. An Illinois
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abuse" (for failing to follow a doctor's orders during pregnancy49
and for manslaughter (for suffering a miscarriage in a car accident
while allegedly driving while intoxicated 0 ); and even imprisonment
solely to allow the government to control directly the woman's
actions for the duration of her pregnancy.5 1
During the last few years, governmental attempts at imposing
special restrictions on women on the basis of pregnancy have been
particularly prevalent in the context of the use of controlled sub-
stances by pregnant women. Of course, pregnant women are not
exempt from prosecution for disobeying laws directed against the
use by any person of illegal drugs such as cocaine or heroin. Yet
during the last few years, several dozen women have been subjected
to criminal prosecution aimed at imposing special and additional
punishments for their use of illegal substances during pregnancy,
premised on the harm the women allegedly caused to the fetuses
they carried.52 The first woman to be criminally convicted under this
court similarly permitted a five-year-old girl to sue her mother for allegedly causing
the child to be born with a damaged intestine due to injuries her mother suffered in
an automobile accident while she was pregnant. The girl alleged that her mother
caused the accident by driving negligently. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on
appeal. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 52 Ill. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920 (1st Dist.
1987), rev'd, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
49 In California, a woman was criminally prosecuted for disobeying her
physician's orders by not seeking immediate medical assistance when she began
bleeding vaginally, by having sexual intercourse with her husband, and by using
illegal drugs during pregnancy, allegedly causing her son to be born brain-damaged.
See People v.-Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987),
50 See DA Sees No Politics in Fetal Death Case, Boston Globe, Sep. 16, 1989, at 25
(Metro/Region).
51 See In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 31, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 529 (1981).
52 Jennifer Johnson, a Florida woman, was convicted in July 1989, the same
month the Court decided Webster. See Mother Is Guilty of Delivering Drug In Course of
Birth, Wall St. J., July 17, 1989, at B12. She was convicted under a statute that
prohibited the distribution of a controlled substance to a minor and contained a
penalty of up to thirty years imprisonment.
Melanie Green of Rockford, Illinois, whose baby died two days after being born
with drugs in her system, in May 1989 became the first woman to be charged with
manslaughter based on her alleged drug use during pregnancy. The grand jury
refused to return an indictment against her. See Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother
in Drug Death of Newborn, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1989, at 18.
Brenda Vaughn of Washington, D.C. pled guilty in April 1988 to forging several
checks. See United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 441 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 7, 1989). Rather than imposing the probation recommended by the prosecutor,
the judge sentenced Ms. Vaughn to prison because she had tested positive for
cocaine and the judge wanted to ensure that she would not use cocaine for the
duration of her pregnancy. When Ms. Vaughn was to be released several weeks
before giving birth as part of a general early release ordered to alleviate a prison
overcrowding emergency, Ms. Vaughn's sentencing judge issued a special order
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type of special prosecution was convicted of delivering illegal drugs
to "a minor" through her umbilical cord during childbirth.
B. Judicial Responses To Threat To Women.'s Fundamental Liberty
Courts have been slow to appreciate the dangers inherent in
imposing these types of special penalties on women and the poten-
tial created for wide-ranging governmental intrusion in pregnant
women's lives if such special penalties are not subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny. The Illinois Supreme Court recently became perhaps
the first court to address these broader implications in a case in
which it refused to allow a girl to sue her mother for allegedly caus-
ing the girl to suffer prenatal injuries. The court noted that if it held
otherwise, "[miother and child would be legal adversaries from the
moment of conception until birth.""3 In a powerful dissent in a
recent analogous case in the Title VII context, Judge Frank Easter-
brook protested the Seventh Circuit's en banc decision upholding a
company's exclusion of all women who had not proven themselves to
be infertile from working with lead due to the potential harmful
effects on fetal development.54 Judge Easterbrook noted that this
type of reasoning could exclude women from more than 20 million
jobs, 5 and that the implications of allowing employers-rather than
exempting her from the early release to ensure that she would stay in prison until she
gave birth. See id.
The prosecution and jailing of women in these initial cases were pursuant to
criminal statutes and sentencing procedures that clearly were not designed for the
purpose of imposing special punishment on pregnant women who use controlled
substances. Since then, however, three states-Illinois, Minnesota, and Delaware-
have enacted legislation specifically for the purpose of imposing such special
penalties. Currently pending in the United States Senate is a bill entitled the "Child
Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989" which would establish model
projects on pregnant women and substance abuse. See S. 1444, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1989) (introduced July 31, 1989). To be eligible for a grant under the bill, a state is
required to certify both that it is a crime in that state for a woman to give birth to "an
infant who is addicted or otherwise injured or impaired by the substance abuse of its
mother during pregnancy" and that the penalty for that crime is three years of
incarceration with mandatory rehabilitation.
53 Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 276, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988)
(stating that the recognition of a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body
would have serious ramifications for all women and their families and for the society's
view of women's reproductive abilities-such rights would make a pregnant woman a
guarantor of the mental and physical health of another, a duty which has never
previously been legally recognized).
54 See International Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F2d 871, 908 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
5-5 See id. at 914 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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the women themselves-to weigh the risks and make the final evalua-
tion were staggering:
How risky is a blood lead level exceeding 30 mg/dl compared with
other hazards? Most comparisons show that smoking and drinking
are quite dangerous to fetuses, more so than many contaminants
found in the workplace .... The hazards created by occupational
chemicals span many orders of magnitude: some are safer than the
sweeteners we wolf down, some are dangerous indeed. Where
does lead fit on that spectrum? I cannot believe that Johnson
would be entitled to fire female employees who smoke or drink
during pregnancy - let alone to fire all female employees because
some might smoke or drink - which makes it hard to exclude
women to curtail risk from other substances.
How does the risk attributable to lead compare, say, to the risk
to the next generation created by driving a taxi? A female bus or
taxi driver is exposed to noxious fumes and the risk of accidents, all
hazardous to a child she carries. Would it follow that taxi and bus
companies can decline to hire women? That an employer could
forbid pregnant employees to drive cars, because of the risk acci-
dents pose to fetuses? For all we can tell, accepting Johnson's
argument compels us to answer "yes" to these questions....
Excluding women from industrial jobs at Johnson may reduce risk
attributable to lead at the cost of increasing other hazards. There
is a strong correlation between the health of the infant and prenatal
medical care; there is also a powerful link between the parents'
income and infants' health, for higher income means better nutri-
tion, among other things. Removing women from well-paying jobs
(and the attendant health insurance), or denying women access to
these jobs, may reduce the risk from lead while also reducing levels
of medical care and the quality of nutrition. The net effect of lower
income and less medical care could be a reduction in infants'
prospects.
56
At least one court has found constitutional barriers exist to legal
recognition of the fetus that would interfere with women's auton-
omy.5 7 A family court in New York held that a woman's prenatal
56 Id. at 916-18 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (footnotes & citations omitted).
57 Only a handful of other courts have even recognized the possibility that
constitutional limits may exist, and the others all rejected the suggestion that those
limits were exceeded in the cases before them. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 617
(D.C. App. 1989) (stating that in ordering a woman to submit to cesarean section,
"the trial judge did not err in subordinating A.C.'s right against bodily intrusion to
the interests of the unborn child and the state"), vacated & reh'g en banc granted, 539
A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988); United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 441 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 1989) (summarily rejecting suggestion that "women's rights"
might prevent incarceration of woman guilty of theft for duration of her pregnancy
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drug use could not alone form the basis of a finding of neglect.5"
Noting that "[b]y becoming pregnant, women do not waive the con-
stitutional protections afforded other citizens," the court stated:
[t]o carry the Law Guardian's argument to its logical extension, the
State would be able to supersede a mother's custody right to her
child if she smoked cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk
food, or did too much physical labor or did not exercise enough.
The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute entirely unac-
ceptable violations of the bodily integrity of women.
59
C. Special Burdens on Womens Liberty to Further Fetal Interests
Trigger Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of liberty protects the individual substantively from
government interference with those certain private matters that are
crucial to self-determination. Although the Justices and constitu-
tional scholars disagree about the precise scope of the protected fun-
damental rights, there is widespread consensus that this
constitutional protection extends beyond those rights specifically
enumerated in the Constitution and also includes at least "those fun-
damental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.' 60
The power to promote perceived fetal interests by imposing
upon women special burdens or penalties would give the govern-
ment almost complete control over women's lives, and thus should
be viewed as implicating the fundamental right to privacy, guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. Such unique restrictions specifi-
cally implicate two strands of the right to privacy that the Supreme
Court has recognized as fundamental and thus entitled to strict judi-
cial scrutiny: the right to choose to bear a child and the right to
bodily integrity.6'
for sole purpose of preventing her use of cocaine); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 89, 274 S.E.2d 457,460 (1981) (Hill,J., concurring)
(concurring in order compelling pregnant woman to submit to cesarean section, but
noting that: "[T]he power of a court to order a competent adult to surgery is
exceedingly limited. Indeed, until this unique case arose, I would have thought such
power to be nonexistent.").
58 See In re Torres, No. N-3968/88 (N.Y., Fam. Ct., Bronx County Oct. 7, 1988).
59 Id. at 6-7.
60 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
61 The fundamental nature of the right involved is also illustrated by Jed
1989]
198 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:179
As a unanimous Court wrote in Whalen v. Roe, 62 among the life-
shaping decisions the Court has found to be protected from govern-
ment interference as part of the fundamental right to privacy are
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education." 63 The Supreme
Court has held that "at the very heart" of the right to privacy lies
"the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'  Although courts
have more often been confronted with attempts by the government
to interfere with women's decisions to prevent or terminate
pregnancies,65 equally protected by the Constitution is a woman's
choice to give birth.66 Just as the government may not force a
woman to bear an unwanted child by restricting women's use of con-
traceptives67 or access to abortion,68 the government may not pre-
vent women from having children through involuntary sterilization
69
or abortion.70 As with other fundamental rights, the government
may not accomplish through indirect coercion what it may not do
Rubenfeld's recent conception of the right to privacy as "the right not to have the
course of one's life dictated by the state." Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 737, 807 (1989).
62 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
63 Id. at 600 n.26 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
64 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1922)).
65 As the Court recognized, "[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate,
more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy than a
woman's decision ... whether to end her pregnancy." Thornburgh v. College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
66 Thus, the Court held unconstitutional a requirement that school teachers
take unpaid maternity leave for the last five months of a pregnancy. See Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Noting that "freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court stated that "[b]y
acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive
maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these
protected freedoms." Id. at 639-40.
67 See Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
70 As Justice Stevens recognized, "if federal judges must allow the state to make
the abortion decision, presumably the state is free to decide that a woman may never
abort, may sometimes abort, or in the People's Republic of China, must always abort if
her family is already too large." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original). Even Solicitor General Kenneth Starr and former
Solicitor General Charles Fried, in urging the Court to overrule Roe, conceded that
the Constitution protects the right to be free from governmentally compelled
abortions. See infra note -.
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directly."1 Permitting a legal regime in which a host of special
restrictions and penalties-not applied equally to all-are imposed
on women based on their reproductive capacity severely interferes
with a woman's decisions about childbirth.
Perhaps the most difficult context in which to argue against the
constitutionality of special restrictions directed against women on
the basis of pregnancy is the context in which such restrictions
recently have been most threatened: the use of illegal substances by
pregnant women. In contrast to more broadly defined legal obliga-
tions imposed on pregnant women, an added burden attached to the
already illegal behavior of using controlled substances may not
involve as great a risk of chilling socially or personally valuable
behavior on the part of the pregnant woman. Society has already
determined, independent of the harm to the fetus, that the behavior
at issue should not occur, in part because it is harmful to the woman
herself. The specificity of the restriction also may mitigate against
problems created by changing notions of "proper" behavior during
pregnancy. Moreover, the risks of harm to fetal development by
drug use by pregnant women are high in comparison to the varied
and uncertain risks associated with the unspecified constraints on
behavior imposed by a general duty of care. Finally, the woman's
state of addiction is likely to diminish the quality of her decisionmak-
ing in general and the extent to which she is willing to alter her
behavior to reflect the effects on fetal development.
Clearly, the Constitution's guarantee of privacy does not directly
protect the right of any individual to engage in each of the countless
activities that could be affected by a governmental assertion of fetal
interests hostile to women's liberty. Yet women's fundamental right
to privacy is implicated by any government intrusion that singles out
pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment regarding a particu-
lar activity, whether or not the government could restrict or -even
71 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973)
(strict scrutiny required if law has "'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the
free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty"). Thus, as the
Court explained, the government is constitutionally barred not only from prohibiting
the distribution of contraceptives but also from requiring that the distribution of
contraceptives be only by licensed pharmacists or from prohibiting advertising about
contraceptives. See Carey, 431 U.S. 678. In the abortion context, the Court has held
unconstitutional statutes that forced women to wait a specified period of time before
obtaining an abortion, see Akron, 462 U.S. at 450-51, that required abortion to be
performed in hospitals, see id. at 431-33, and that imposed biased or "specific and
intrusive" informed consent requirements, See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-63; Akron,
462 U.S. at 442.
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criminalize that same activity for all persons. Some commentators
have argued that unless the particular activity at issue, such as riding
in a car or smoking cigarettes or using cocaine, is itself entitled to
fundamental constitutional protection, burdens placed uniquely on
pregnant women's ability to engage in that behavior are subject only
to rational basis review. 72 This analysis ignores the critical fact that
the constitutionally suspect governmental action that triggers height-
ened scrutiny is the imposition of additional burdens on women solely
on the basis of their reproductive capacity. Although the state
could-and in some cases does-ban the use by any person (includ-
ing a pregnant woman) of a certain substance (such as cocaine, alco-
hol or cigarettes), prohibiting only pregnant women from using that
substance is meant to control behavior only as it relates to procrea-
tion.73 The government's rationale underlying differential and dis-
advantageous treatment on the basis of pregnancy could be used to
impose special restrictions of virtually unlimited scope on women's
liberty, consequently treating pregnant women as less than full legal
persons. A woman's autonomy in matters of childbearing is undeni-
ably burdened by governmental attempts to deprive pregnant
women of the power to make their own decisions and control their
own lives during pregnancy to the same extent that all other people
are permitted to do so.
For example, in accordance with its declaration that life begins
at conception and in order to protect the safety of the fetus, the Mis-
souri legislature might enact a law forbidding pregnant women-or
all potentially pregnant women-to drive cars over 45 miles per hour
on roads where others are permitted to drive 55 miles per hour. The
72 See, e.g., Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the
Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1219-20 (1987) (stating that "in the case of maternal
substance abuse, the right which collides with the state's interest in the life and well-
being of a fetus is the pregnant mother's right to use alcohol, tobacco and drugs for
physical and psychic pleasure .... The issue... is a pregnant woman's right to use
alcohol, tobacco, and narcotics after she has decided not to obtain an abortion").
73 A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review made this point well:
The decisions in question here - what to eat or drink, when to go the
doctor, whether to have sex, and so forth - have both procreative and
nonprocreative aspect. Indeed, regulating such decisions for all people -
for example, banning all alcohol consumption - has no procreative
significance. If states limit consumption only for pregnant women,
however, they would be regulating the procreative aspect of the decision
whether to drink. Such laws seek to control the incidents of procreation,
infringing on a woman's power to make decisions about how she will live
her life during her pregnancy.
Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal
Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 995, 1000 (1988).
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Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to drive over
45 miles per hour, and the state could make it illegal for everyone to
exceed that speed limit. Similarly, the government can and has made
illegal the use of cocaine by any person, and a woman clearly is not
immune from prosecution under such general laws simply because
she is or may become pregnant. Yet a law that would impose a lower
speed limit or greater penalty for cocaine use as a special burden
only on pregnant women must be closely scrutinized to ensure that
the additional penalty is necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest. Without such judicial review, women would be -
forced to live in fear that should they became pregnant, or simply
choose to remain fertile, the government could impose extensive
burdens on their freedom. Such interference with women's liberty
may seem more justifiable as the risk of fetal harm increases. Con-
cem about increased risk, however, is relevant only to whether the
state's interest is compelling and the restriction necessary and not to
the basic notion that special restrictions implicate a fundamental lib-
erty interest and require strict scrutiny.
Given the physical realities of pregnancy, the recognition of hos-
tile fetal interests implicates not only the woman's right to decision-
making autonomy in matters of childbearing, -but also a second
aspect of the fundamental right to privacy: the right to bodily integ-
rity. Many commentators on the nature of the fundamental right to
privacy have concluded that a degree of control over one's own phys-
ical person is essential to any definition of the privacy right."4
Because the fetus is a physical part of a woman, allowing the govern-
ment to assert and enforce interests in the fetus adverse to the
woman's interests would by definition seize control over a woman's
physical person.
Because the principle of bodily integrity is so deeply embedded
in our common law and constitutional traditions, the government
has rarely attempted bodily intrusions analogous to those inherent in
the assertion of fetal interests against pregnant women. In the few
existing relevant cases, the Supreme Court has rejected such
attempts. The Court has found, for example, that "the individual's
dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity" would be
74 See, e.g., Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 266 (1977)
(stating that "[any plausible definition of privacy ... whatever the sources of its
normative commitments, must take the body as its first and most basic reference for
control over personal identity").
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violated by compelling a criminal defendant to submit to surgery in
order to retrieve a bullet necessary for the state's prosecution.
75
The constitutional dimensions of the bodily intrusion inherent
in governmental recognition of fetal interests in a manner antagonis-
tic to pregnant women's liberty are perhaps clearest in the cases in
which courts have ordered women to submit against their will to
cesarean sections to further perceived fetal interests, despite all the
attendant risks of surgery including possible injury from the general
anesthesia and infection from the incision.76 In addition to the Mis-
souri case, a study reported in the New England Journal of Medicine
found that courts in at least ten states and the District of Columbia
have overridden the decisions of competent, adult, pregnant women
and ordered them to deliver by cesarean section.77 In at least one
75 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985); see also Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (overturning criminal conviction based on evidence obtained
from "shocking" bodily invasion of forced stomach pumping).
76 Even former Solicitor General Charles Fried, in urging the Court to overrule
Roe v. Wade during oral argument in Webster, conceded that a forced medical
procedure would violate the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of liberty:
Justice O'Connor: Do you think the state has the right to, if in a future
century we had a serious overpopulation problem, has a right to require
women to have abortions after so many children?
Mr. Fried: I surely do not. That would be a different matter.
Justice O'Connor: What do you rest that on?
Mr. Fried: Because unlike abortion, which involves the purposeful
termination of future life, that would involve not preventing an operation
but violently taking hands on, laying hands on a woman and submitting
her to an operation and a whole constellation -
Justice O'Connor: And you would rest that on substantive due process
protection?
Mr. Fried: Absolutely.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14.
In a brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota, Nos. 88-
1125, 88-1309 (Oct. 1989) (to be argued Nov. 29, 1989) the current Solicitor Gen-
eral, Kenneth Starr, also recognized that an unwanted medical intrusion would vio-
late the Constitution. Although still urging the Court to overrule Roe and hold that
the government may prohibit women from obtaining abortions, the Solicitor General
attempted to distinguish government action that would force women to have abor-
tions. "By contrast, a state law mandating abortions would present a starkly different
question. Our Nation's history and traditions establish that a competent adult may
generally refuse unwanted medical intrusion. This right would, we believe, extend to
an unwanted abortion." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents In No. 88-1125 And Supporting Cross-Petitioners in No. 88-1309,
Hodgson, at 14 n.7. Both Fried and Starr failed to recognize the obvious: compelled
pregnancy and childbirth-including six to twelve hours or more of grueling labor
and delivery, or abdominal surgery in the one in four cases in which delivery is by
cesarean section-also constitute the government "violently taking hands on, laying
hands on a woman," counter to "our Nation's history and tradition."
77 See Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 47.
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such case, the woman physically resisted the surgery and was tied to
the hospital bed while her husband was forcibly removed.7 In a sec-
ond case, a woman who was very ill with cancer was ordered to
undergo a cesarean section, despite the unanimous objections of the
woman, her husband, her parents and her physicians, and despite the
uncontroverted fact that it might hasten the woman's death.79 The
fetus was not viable and did not survive; the woman herself died two
days later. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which had
refused to stay the order, issued an opinion subsequent to the
woman's death in which it stated, "we well know that we may have
shortened [her] life span," but concluded that the value of her
remaining life was outweighed by the "slim" chance that the fetus
might survive s ° The woman's death certificate listed the surgery as
a contributing factor.
These wide-ranging special burdens ostensibly imposed in the
name of fetal protection obviously are directed only against women,
and only women suffer the resulting deep deprivations of liberty.
8 1
By promoting governmental interests in improving fetal develop-
ment through the means of exerting governmental control over
women's decisions and actions regarding employment, medical treat-
ment, diet and overall lifestyle choices, male-dominated governmen-
tal bodies echo the rationale behind laws that once barred women
from equal protection in the paid labor force8 2 and political and civic
78 "Confronted with the doctor's intentions, the woman and her husband
became irate. The husband was asked to leave, refused, and was forcedly removed
from the hospital by seven security officers. The woman became combative and was
placed in full leathers, a term that refers to leather wrist and ankle cuffs that are
attached to the four comers of a bed to prevent the patient from moving. Despite
her restraints, the woman continued to scream for help and bit through her
intravenous tubing in an attempt to get free." Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 9, 10 (1987)
(quoting V. Kolder, Women's Health Law; A Feminist Perspective, 1-2 (Aug. 1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at the Harvard Women's Law Journal).
79 See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated & reh'g en banc granted, 539
A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
80 See id. at 613-14, 617.
81 An additional cause for concern is that special restrictions are likely to be
placed disproportionately on poor women and women of color, For example, a
national survey that documented twenty-one cases in which court orders were sought
to compel pregnant women to undergo medical treatment (fifteen cases involved
cesarean sections, three cases involved hospital detentions, and the remaining three
cases involved intrauterine transfusions), found that 81% of the women involved
were black, Asian, or Hispanic. See Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 47, at
1192-93.
82 See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (special restrictions placed on
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affairs.8 3 Then, as now, the law's professed concern was that certain
actions by women-such as working above a specified maximum
number of hours-would have "injurious effect upon the body,"
which was a proper focus of concern for the government because "as
healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." 84 Thus, in
addition to implicating women's fundamental privacy rights, special
penalties imposed on pregnant women discriminate on the basis of
gender and therefore must be supported by an "'exceedingly per-
suasive justification.' -85
D. Strict Scrutiny: Two Applications
As is generally true of a law that interferes with an individual's
fundamental rights, any action that places special burdens on women
premised on women's childbearing capacity must be strictly scruti-
the number of hours women were permitted to work outside the home); Bradwell v.
Oregon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (women excluded from the practice of law).
83 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (women exempted from
participation in jury duty), overruled, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (women who "chose" not to vote exempted
from paying poll tax).
84 Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
85 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 461 (1981)). For a more extensive discussion of the
limitations imposed by the guarantee of equal protection on the governmental
promotion of fetal interests, see Note, supra note 28, at 620-25.
The Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), creates some
doubt concerning the protection that the Supreme Court will afford women in this
context by the guarantee of equal protection. The Court in Geduldig declared-
briefly in a footnote-that the exclusion of pregnant women from state disability
insurance benefits did not discriminate against women by permissibly distinguished
between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. See id. at 496 n.20. Geduldig has
been widely criticized by commentators, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTi-rrIoNAL LAw § 15-29, at 1578 (2d ed. 1988) (describing distinction as "so
artificial as to approach the farcical"), and the Court's application of Geduldig to the
Title VII context in General Elec..Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), was rejected by
Congress through passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 20003(k) (1982).
Whether or not Geduldig remains good law, it would not be dispositive here. In a
subsequent decision, the Court, now with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the
majority, adopted a limiting interpretation of Geduldig by distinguishing between the
refusal in Geduldig to extend a "benefit that men cannot and do not receive" and the
imposition of a "burden that men need not suffer." Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136 (1977). The imposition of special penalties and restrictions only on women
on the basis of pregnancy falls squarely on the affirmative burden side, and can in no
way be considered the failure to provide a benefit. See L. TRIBE, supra, § 15-29, at
1579 (describing distinction as "at best problematic").
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nized. The constitutional bar to governmental intrusion in these
protected areas is not absolute. Rather, courts evaluating such gov-
ernmental action must carefully examine the interest beingpursued
by the government to determine whether it is compelling. Not only
must the governmental interest be sufficiently compelling to justify
the intrusion, the governmental act at issue must also actually further
that compelling interest and must be narrowly tailored to do so.
An application of strict scrutiny to instances in which the gov-
ernment has already sought to promote fetal interests by controlling
women's actions reveals that, though theoretically possible, no use of
such coercive measures is likely to survive strict scrutiny. The gov-
ernmental interest asserted to be compelling is the important goal of
promoting healthy pregnancies and healthy babies. An infant born
suffering from a physical injury that occurred during fetal develop-
ment due to a pregnant woman's behavior will have to live with the
hardships of that injury.8 6 The government undoubtedly has a
strong interest in improving the health of our nation's infants, just as
it does in safeguarding the health of all U.S. citizens. No one would
dispute the desirability of that goal. The United States has a great
deal of room for improvement in this area: its infant mortality rate
places it a dismal eighteenth in the world. 7
That the government's interest is an important one, however,
does not ensure that it is sufficiently compelling to justify interfer-
ence with a fundamental right. Although the Supreme Court has
never articulated precise guidelines for determining whether a par-
ticular asserted interest is compelling, it is evident from the Court's
86 This interest is analytically distinct, for example, from a governmental
interest in prohibiting abortion after viability or the interest asserted by Missouri
through its sweeping declaration that life begins at conception. The Missouri
declaration is aimed at creating "fetal personhood" under the law, including a fetal
right-to-be-born. It does not reflect a concern for the future child, but a belief that
the fertilized ovum is already a child and deserving of the same legal protection as a
child, even at the expense of the pregnant woman.
87 See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 12
(1989). The incidence of low birthweight in this country has not improved in this
decade, and has actually increased among women of color. Id. at 6. Low birthweight
is closely tied to infant mortality: infants born weighing 2,500 grams (5.5 pounds) or
less are almost 40 times more likely to die during their first four weeks of life than
normal birthweight infants. See Hughes, Johnson, Rosenbaum & Simons, The Health
of America's Mothers and Children: Trends in Access to Care, 20 Clearinghouse Review 472
(1986). In addition to its interest in the social costs, the government also has a
monetary interest at stake. By the year 2000 the government will spend 6 billion
dollars annually on the care of low birthweight infants during their first year of life.
See HEALTH OF AMERICAN'S CHILDREN, MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH DATA BOOK
(1989).
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jurisprudence that it the Court will not unquestionably accept a
state's mere assertion that an interest is compelling."8 The Court
has carefully evaluated even interests that appear to be compelling in
the abstract to ascertain whether the interest outweighs in impor-
tance the protection of a particular right in a particular context.
8 9
For example, among the important interests the Court has found to
be insufficiently compelling in certain contexts to outweigh compet-
ing rights and interests are interests in protecting the victims of sex-
ual abuse, 90 protecting foreign diplomats in accordance with
international law,9 1 redressing generalized societal racial discrimina-
tion,92 providing role models for minority students,93 and preserving
the public order.94 So, too, an interest in improving infant health,
while extremely weighty, is insufficiently compelling to justify
allowing the government to control the actions of pregnant women
in ways "essentially limitless in scope and duration" 95 and unparal-
88 As the Court recently reaffirmed: "[T]he mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
648 (1975)). For a comprehensive discussion of compelling interests in the related
context of abortion restrictions, see Dellinger & Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme
Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989).
89 The author used this argument in a brief submitted in Webster to oppose the
recognition of a compelling interest in potential life from the moment of conception
that is sufficient to outweigh a woman's fundamental right to choose to have an
abortion. See Brief of Seventy-seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality
as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
90 See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988) (criminal defendant's sixth
amendment rights "outweighed" state's interest in "protecting victims of sexual
abuse").
91 See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1165 (1988) (though "as a general
proposition" the government "has a vital national interest" in protecting foreign
diplomats in accordance with international law, that interest is not "automatically...
compelling" when its assertion infringes upon first amendment rights); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that courts may not "distort" the Constitution in order to approve all that
the state may deem to be expedient and in the national interest when fundamental
rights are at stake).
92 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723 (1989)
(governmental interest in redressing generalized societal discrimination deemed not
to be sufficiently compelling to justify race-conscious remedies).
93 See id. (governmental interest in providing role models not sufficiently
compelling to justify race-conscious remedies because it "could be used to 'justify'
race-based decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and duration" (citing
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986))).
94 See Cohen v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (governmental interest in
preserving the public order not sufficiently weighty to justify restrictions on free
expression because it is "inherently boundless").
95 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723.
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leled in our American system of law.96 The willingness of male-dom-
inated legislatures and courts to inflict unique burdens on pregnant
women not also imposed generally on the public is particularly sus-
pect in light of our nation's "long and unfortunate history"97 of une-
qual treatment of women on the basis of pregnancy.
Even assuming that the governmental interest being asserted
was sufficiently compelling to support special restrictions on preg-
nant women's liberty, such measures are generally not necessary or
narrowly tailored; moreover, they do not further at all the govern-
ment's interest in the fetus and often prove to be counterproductive.
The important goal of promoting healthy pregnancies and healthy
babies is far better served by recognizing the commonalities of inter-
est between pregnant women and the government in accomplishing
this goal, rather than by artificially creating legal conflicts between
pregnant women and the fetuses they carry.
This is true even in what is perhaps the most difficult context in
which to argue against the constitutionality of special restrictions
imposed on women on the basis of pregnancy: the use of already
illegal substances by pregnant women. As discussed above, even if a
particular activity is already illegal, any governmental action aimed at
imposing additional burdens and penalties on the procreative aspect
of that activity only when engaged in by pregnant or potentially
pregnant women must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest."
Of course, substance abuse by pregnant women is a serious
problem which can be detrimental to fetal development as well as to
women's own health. Although the government has an important
role to play in addressing this problem, directing special penalties
against women for substance abuse during pregnancy simply is not
effective.9" None of the specific coercive measures used to date can
96 While special governmental regulation of women's behavior would seek to
protect the health an well-being of a person that will be born in the future, the law
never imposes comparable burdens on all individuals to protect other people who
are already born. See L. TRIBE, supra note 85, § 15-10, at 1354 ("[T]he law nowhere
forces men to devote their bodies and restructure their lives even in those tragic
situations (such as organ transplants) where nothing less will permit their children to
survive.").
97 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
98 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
99 For an excellent analysis from a health policy perspective of the
ineffectiveness of imposing special interest criminal penalties on substance abuse
during pregnancy, see Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of
Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 10 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
277, 292-309 (1987-88).
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survive close scrutiny. The remainder of this comment will examine
two such attempts: the first criminal prosecution of a woman for
allegedly "neglecting" her fetus though drug use and other behavior
while pregnant in the case of People v. Stewart 100 and a bill introduced
in the Senate in July 1989, which is a narrower, more precise attempt
to legislate special penalties against pregnant women who use con-
trolled substances.
1. The Prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart
Pamela Rae Stewart gave birth to her third child, a son, in
November 1985.01 He was born with severe brain damage and died
six weeks later. More than nine months after losing her son, Ms.
Stewart was arrested and prosecuted for allegedly causing his death
through her actions during pregnancy, including her use of mari-
juana and amphetamines. Ms. Stewart suffered great harm during
the five months the charges were pending: she spent six days in jail
before she could make bail, and the most intimate details of her per-
sonal life became a staple for the national press. As one editorial
observed, the media "held back nothing, not even the details of her
last sex act before the baby was delivered."' 0 2 Ultimately, the court
dismissed the charges, finding that the prosecution was pursuant to a
criminal statute that did not extend to Ms. Stewart's alleged behav-
ior. Yet, the court expressly left open the constitutionality of possi-
ble future legislation that might provide the basis for similar
prosecutions.
In prosecuting Ms. Stewart, the state not only cited her alleged
use of drugs during pregnancy, but also claimed that Ms. Stewart
contributed to her son's death by failing to obtain adequate medical
care during pregnancy. Specifically, she was accused of waiting many
hours before seeking medical help after she began bleeding
vaginally; the prosecution claimed that this was contrary to express
advice from her physician to seek immediate medical care if she
began to hemorrhage. The prosecutor claimed further that Stewart's
100 No. M508197 (San Diego, Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987).
101 Information about the Stewart case is taken largely from the following
sources: Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Demurrer to Complaint Without Leave to Amend, People v. Stewart, No. M508197
(San Diego, Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987); Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss, People v. Stewart; Brief Amici Curiae,
People v. Stewart. For further discussion of the Stewart case and the ethical and
policy issues it raises, see Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy,
Hastings Center Report, at 33 (Aug. 1987).
102 Editorial, Drop the Charges Against Stewart, The Tribune, Nov. 11, 1986, at B6.
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physician told her not to engage in sexual intercourse with her hus-
band, but she nevertheless did so. She was prosecuted under a stat-
ute that made it a crime for a parent to "willfully omit[ ], without
lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical
attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child."' 0'
The statute used in the Stewart case thus was not narrowly tai-
lored to the government's interest in promoting healthy babies.
Rather, by requiring women "to furnish necessary clothing, food,
shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care" to their
fetuses, or face criminal prosecution and incarceration, it would have
forced women to live their lives as ideal incubators and to
subordinate all other interests including the well-being of themselves
and their families in order to minimize any risk of fetal harm. The
government's interest could not possibly be so broad as to support
this outcome; clearly, the government wants women to work as pro-
ductive members of society, the economy and the family.
A broad and vague requirement as in this statute would also be
entirely unworkable and ineffective. Complicated choices involving
the weighing of competing interests and risks arise every day of a
woman's pregnancy-choices between the fundamental demands of
job, family, and health. In a dissent from a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upholding an
employer's blanket exclusion of all fertile women from working with
lead, Judge Richard Cudahy suggested some of the intricacies of
those decisions and why the decisions should be the woman's to
make:
What is the situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed or work-
ing for the minimum wage and unprotected by health insurance, in
relation to her pregnant sister, exposed to an indeterminate lead
risk but well-fed, housed and doctored? Whose fetus is at greater
risk? ... Whose decision is this to make?
10 4
Great uncertainties exist about what is desirable behavior for
pregnant women. The conventional wisdom has altered dramatically
over time, along with advances in knowledge and changes in societal
attitudes about the extent to which women should be confined and
defined by their role as childbearers. Moreover, because numerous
factors contribute to fetal development, physicians and courts cannot
predict with much reliability what effect a woman's actions will have
103 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1986).
104 International Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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on her fetus' development. Nor can the courts usually determine
after a child's birth what particular action by the pregnant woman
may have caused a particular infirmity.
To promote its interest in healthy babies, the government can
pursue one of two very divergent approaches. The first approach,
taken by the prosecutor in the Stewart case, employs means that are
hostile to and create conflicts with women's interests and constitu-
tional rights. The facts of the Stewart case dramatically illustrate, why
the threat of criminal prosecution typically is ineffective and even
counterproductive to improving the health of babies and pregnant
women. Ms. Stewart was very poor; while pregnant with her third
child, she lived with and cared for her husband and two small daugh-
ters, first in a single hotel room and then in a mobile home they
shared with her mother-in-law. Ms. Stewart may have been a bat-
tered woman; the police were called ten to fifteen times over one
year to respond to violence directed at Ms. Stewart and her mother-
in-law by Mr. Stewart. 0 5 Ms. Stewart's son's injuries may have been
caused by her loss of blood during delivery, which was due to her
having a dangerous complication known as placenta previa, which
can be life-threatening for the pregnant woman. Although her pros-
ecution was based on her alleged failure to call for immediate medi-
cal help when she began bleeding, on two prior occasions Ms.
Stewart had called her physician when she noticed she was bleeding;
she had been told both times that "everything was fine."
' 06
Yet there exists an alternative approach that is less restrictive as
well as more effective than the creation of legal conflicts between
pregnant women and the fetuses they bear. The government's inter-
est in improving the health of newborns is entirely consistent with
the interests of pregnant women and can be pursued by means that
coincide with women's interests. A woman who has chosen to bear a
child obviously has a great interest in giving birth to a healthy baby.
Pregnant women typically will go to great lengths and risk significant
harm to their own health in the interests of their future child's well-
being. The typical problem for poor women like Ms. Stewart is not a
lack of desire, but a lack of the resources necessary to improve the
outcomes of their pregnancies. Fetal well-being is tied directly to the
physical well-being of women during pregnancy. Clearly the princi-
pal means to promote the birth of healthy babies is to promote
105 See Neighbors Cite Mother's Troubled Past, Daily Californian, at la; The Ordeal of
Pamela Rae Stewart, Ms.July/Aug. 1987, at 92, 94.
106 Woman Charged in Fetal Neglect Did Not Abuse Drugs, Husband Says, San Diego
Union, Sept. 30, 1986, at BI.
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healthy pregnancies by making available to all women good prenatal
care as well as education about what constitutes good prenatal care.
One-third of all women giving birth in 1985 did not receive adequate
prenatal care. Statistics among black women are even worse: half
did not receive proper medical attention before their babies were
born. 0 7 Infants of women who did not receive adequate prenatal
care are more than three times as likely to die within the first year of
birth.108 Low birthweight is largely preventable through high quality
prenatal care, and also through good health care before pregnancy.
A 1985 study by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy
of Sciences identifies women on welfare with less than a high school
education as being at "high risk" of giving birth to a low birthweight
infant with a higher risk of infant mortality and other health
problems; the report concluded that "every additional dollar spent
for prenatal care within the target group would save $3.38 in the
total cost of caring for low birthweight infants requiring expensive
medical care."
1 0 9
2. The Wilson Bill
Since the Court decided Webster, three states have enacted stat-
utes specifically imposing special penalties on women who use con-
trolled substances during pregnancy, 1 0 and in July 1989, Senator
Peter Wilson introduced in the United States Senate a bill entitled
the "Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989"
designed to encourage the states to enact such legislation." 1 In
order to be eligible for a grant to establish a model project on preg-
nant women and substance abuse under the bill, a state must certify
that it is a crime in that state for a woman to give birth to "an infant
who is addicted or otherwise injured or impaired by the substance
abuse of its mother during pregnancy." The state must impose a
penalty of three years of incarceration in a custodial rehabilitation
107 See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 4
(1989).
108 See Hughes, Johnson, Rosenbaum & Simons, The Health of America's Mothers
and Children: Trends in Access for Care, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEw 473 (1986).
109 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE: COMMrrrEE TO
STUDY THE PREVENTION OF Low BIRTHWEIGHT, PREVENTING Low BIRTHWEIGHT 1-4, 7-
8, 20, 31 (1985).
110 See supra note 52.
III S. 1444 101th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter The Wilson Bill]. Many,
if not all, of the recent prosecutions of women for allegedly causing fetal harm
through drug use are constitutionally suspect because the prosecutions were
pursuant to statutes that clearly were not enacted for that purpose.
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center for any woman convicted of this crime. The Wilson bill is a
useful example on which to focus in order to examine the constitu-
tionality of such legislation.
Interestingly, organizations from both sides of the abortion
issue-from the National Abortion Rights Action League and
Planned Parenthood to the National Right to Life Committee and
the U.S. Catholic Conference-oppose the use of special punitive
measures specifically aimed at women who use illegal drugs during
pregnancy. This can be explained by the difference in the govern-
mental interests behind restrictions on women's choice of abortion
and penalties directed at pregnant women's use of controlled sub-
stances. While abortion restrictions are aimed at legislating a partic-
ular moral view of the fetus, the government's interest in preventing
pregnant women from using controlled substances is aimed at
improving the health of babies that will be born, and there is agree-
ment among a broad spectrum of organizations that special punitive
measures against pregnant women do not accomplish this latter goal.
The stated purpose of the Wilson bill is to prevent substance
abuse by pregnant women, through outreach, intervention, and
mandatory rehabilitation, in order to reduce the incidence of births
of infants who are addicted or otherwise injured by their mother's
substance abuse during pregnancy. The bill finds that 375,000
infants are born each year to women who engage in substance abuse
during pregnancy, which accounts for eleven percent of all births." 2
The bill describes the harm suffered by children as a result as includ-
ing "severe and lasting or even irreversible physical, mental, and
emotional damage to the child, including low birthweight, prematu-
rity, congenital deformities, risk of child abuse, and death." The bill
estimates that the annual cost of providing initial care to infants born
suffering these harms is over thirteen billion dollars." 
3
While there is broad-based, vigorous opposition to the Wilson
bill's specific substantive provisions, its recognition of the problems
associated with substance abuse by pregnant women is relatively
noncontroversial." 14 Yet the government's interest in improving
112 Id. at § 2 (a)(3).
113 Id. at § 2 (a)(4).
114 Dr. IraJ. Chasnoff, the president of the National Association of Perinatal
Addiction Research and Education, one of the nation's leading experts on the effects
on fetal development of substance abuse by pregnant women, testified before
Congress on the Wilson bill and largely confirmed its findings as to the harmful
effects of substance abuse. See Testimony of Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff, before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, July 31, 1989. Yet Dr. Chasnoff is also
one of the most vocal opponents of addressing the problem with punitive measures
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infant health does not rise to the level of a compelling interest sup-
porting the imposition of special penalties, including incarceration
and prosecution for murder, on substance abuse by pregnant
women. Moreover, the existence of a compelling interest would not
end the court's inquiry. The government action must also be effec-
tive and narrowly tailored to further the compelling interest.
Significantly, the Wilson bill, like the prosecution in the Stewart
case, would restrict more than pregnant women's use of illegal sub-
stances. The Wilson bill includes in its definition of "substance
abuse" the "excessive or injurious ingestion of legal substances,
including beverage alcohol."' 15 Similarly, in ordering the incarcera-
tion of a woman for the duration of her pregnancy solely to prevent
her from using cocaine, a Washington, D.C. judge indicated that he
would considerjailing a woman to prevent her from drinking alcohol
or smoking cigarettes.116 Certainly, the harms to fetal development
through the ingestion by pregnant women of other substances, such
as alcohol and cigarettes, make difficult a principled distinction,
which highlights the problem with the government ever imposing
special penalties on women in order to control their actions during
pregnancy.
Measures such as the Wilson bill do not even meet the minimum
threshold of furthering the asserted governmental interest. If the
interest at issue is to decrease the harmful effects to fetal develop-
ment of substance abuse by pregnant women, any effective strategy
for dealing with the problem must increase women's ability to over-
come their addictions. Coercive measures such as the Wilson bill
have precisely the opposite effect and would exacerbate the problem.
Threatening women with special penalties such as incarceration, in
the form of three years of mandatory, residential treatment, for using
illegal drugs during pregnancy would not deter their use of drugs." 
7
It would, however, discourage women from seeking treatment and
thereby making their addiction known. Fear of prosecution will also
deter substance-dependent women from seeking any prenatal care at
all, which is particularly harmful to fetal development because such
women already constitute a high risk group in need of closely moni-
such as those contained in the Wilson bill. Dr. Chasnoff and groups like NARAL and
the NRLC are united in their opposition to approaches such as the Wilsoh bill
because they are simply ineffective.
1-5 The Wilson Bill, § 3 (a)(1).
116 See United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 441 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 7, 1989).
117 The Wilson Bill, § 3 (c)(1)(c)(5).
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tored prenatal care. Women might even refuse to seek medical care
at the time of delivery, due to the Wilson bill's requirement that
health care providers report to the authorities the birth of "sub-
stance abused" infants;' 18 this would result in addicted babies being
born under dangerous conditions without any medical attention.
The most intrusive means of pursuing the government's inter-
est-putting substance-dependent women in prison in order to pro-
tect their fetuses-is also the least effective, and indeed
counterproductive, because it is likely to increase the harm to fetal
development. Prisons are notoriously unsafe and unhealthy for
pregnant women and their fetuses. One two-and-a-half year study of
three state prisons in California found that all three were far below
the minimum standards set by the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists." 9 The study also found that more than a third
of the pregnancies resulted in late-term miscarriages, a rate more
than twice that in the community. In one prison, only twenty-one
percent of the pregnancies among inmates ended in live births.'
20
Finally, the government may not use the means of promoting its
interest that is the most intrusive of women's liberty-imprisonment
and mandatory residential treatment-when there exists a clearly
less restrictive alternative of making voluntary treatment programs
available for all pregnant women who desire help. In fact, voluntary
treatment programs are not available for the majority of pregnant
women who desire treatment. Many drug treatment programs rou-
tinely turn away pregnant women, partly due to fear of potential
legal liability in cases of miscarriage or fetal abnormality. The wait
for admission into a program is often longer than the remainder of
the woman's pregnancy. Even in New York City, a survey of the
treatment programs revealed that eighty-seven percent admitted that
they would not treat pregnant women on Medicaid who were
addicted to cocaine.' 2 ' The overwhelming majority of treatment
118 Id. § 3 (c)(1)(c)(3).
119 See Lacroix, Birth of a Bad Idea; Jailing Mothers for Drug Abuse, The Nation, at
585-88 (1989).
J20 See id. One report of three lawsuits against prison officials by pregnant
inmates described the inmates' complaints as follows: "under normal circumstances,
pregnant women in U.S. jails and prisons get little exercise or fresh air, eat poorly,
and are crowded into unsanitary cells. In the worst of circumstances, they say,
pregnant prisoners are locked in stripped-down isolation cells, given drugs
dangerous to their unborn children, or shackled during labor and delivery." Stein &
Mistiaen, Pregnant in Prison, The Progressive (Feb. 1988).[NOT EDITED]
121 See Testimony of Dr. Wendy Chavkin, before the House Select Committee
on Children, Youth and Families, Apr. 27, 1989.
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programs that will admit pregnant women do not provide child care
for the women's other children; a 1988 study by the Association of
Junior Leagues found that the primary barrier for women in
obtaining treatment was the lack of child care.
1 22
Rather than creating constitutional and practical problems by
attempting to treat the fetus as a legal entity separate from the preg-
nant woman of whom it is a physical part, and then asserting inter-
ests in conflict with the rights of the pregnant woman, the
government should continue to recognize a pregnant woman as a
single legal entity and help her to further her own strong interest in
giving birth to a healthy baby. As a matter of good public policy, the
government should choose this latter path; as a matter of constitu-
tional limitations, the government must do so.
122 See Association ofJunior Leagues, Woman to Woman Project (1988).
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